Legal Case Study: Fourth Circuit Upholds Race Discrimination Claim of Baltimore City Police Officer to Proceed to Discovery

In Johnson v. Baltimore City et. al., the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals revived a dismissed lawsuit and affirmed a lenient pleading standard in Maryland federal courts for pleading a racial discrimination case based upon the theory of disparate treatment.  Slip Op. 25-1124 (4th Cir. Jan. 6, 2026).  The lawsuit involved a female African-American police offcer who testified against another officer, and soon enough, found herself subject to discipline, which she alleges, would not be imposed upon non-black police officers.  Slip Op. 1-17.

The theory of disparate treatment means that the person filing the lawsuit, the plaintiff, has been treated worse than similarly situated co-workers who are of another racial category, or other category than the protected class alleging the discrimination.  Slip Op. 8-10.  The Fourth Circuit rejected a strict comparison, and was willing to consider all of the comparison co-workers together, rather than one to one. Taken together, the comparisons were held sufficient to proceed initially.

This opinion is scheduled to be published.  The dismissed lawsuit is now remanded back to the trial court to be reopened for discovery.

I. Comparsion Must Be Similar:

The Fourth Circuit, first, frames the motion to dismiss standard leniently in line with precedent.  The Court states that "a complaint survives if it states a plausible claim for relief that permits the court to 'infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct' based upon 'its judicial experience and common sense.'" Slip Op. at 8 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009)).

The Fourth Circuit also affirmed a similar, but not exact, standard for measuring what co-workers can serve as evidence to compare, in line with precedent.  The court states: "Appellant alleged sufficiently similar comparators for a jury to reasonably infer their similarity because the comparators: (1) engaged in similar conduct; (2) held the same position; and (3) were assumingly subject to the same set of standards." Slip Op. at 16.

The Court rejected the dissenting contention that comparison co-workers need to be similar in all respects, but rather in "all relevant respects."  Id.  While in the abstract, this may appear confusing, the opinion illustrates what is required. 

First, the complaint alleged comparison to 13 co-workers.  These co-workers were all police officers, which the Fourth Circuit deemed sufficiently similar.  The co-workers did not all need to have the same supervisor or same rank.  Slip Op. at 12-16.  It appears the comparison used here was that all were charged with conduct, but not necessarily found guilty of it.  Some were and some were not, and the Court's focus on "allegations together" found it sufficient.  Id. at 15-16.

While the plaintiff here was found to have committed workplace infractions by a police trial board, the Fourth Circuit found that a combination of comparable co-workers, "all of the allegations together," with some co-workers charged and found guilty, some never charged, and some who had charges dropped, all together, could state a comparsion to permit a viable claim for disparate treatment based on race.  Id. at 15-16.

II. Comparsion Must be "Meaningful":

A court has discretion to deem comparisons are "meaningful" or not, according to the Fourth Circuit.  Slip Op. at 14. 

In fact, the trial court below found these comparisons were not sufficient and dismissed the lawsuit.  See Johnson v. BPD et. al., No. 1:23-cv-02215-RDB, Mem. Op. Doc. 31 (D. Md. Jan. 6, 2025). The trial court rejected several comparisons of discipline as not analogous.  Some did not involve making false statements as occurred with plaintiff.  Second, the trial court found only two comparisons involved officers found guilty by a trial board as occurred with plaintiff.  Even with these two found guilty, one involved a different sort of workplace infraction, summarized the trial court.  The second trial board decision was overturned, making it not comparible to charges being sustained. Mem. Op. Doc. 31, at pp. 24-28.

The Fourth Circuit summarized the trial court decision as follows:

"The district court held that none of the 13 other employees that Appellant identified were sufficiently similar to Appellant to qualify as comparators based on the ground that 'none were accused of and found guilty following a trial board of misconduct similar to [Appellant].' In doing so, the district court required a perfect one-to-one match between proffered comparators’ conduct and Appellant’s alleged conduct that included 'assault, failing to notify her supervisors of the assault, and [] making false statements on two separate occasions relating to an investigation.' This was in error."

Slip Op. at 14 (citations omitted).  

Overall, the Fourth Circuit's decision can be framed as having considered "all of the allegations together" rather than examined them one by one, rejected each one, which is the procedure in the trial court's dismissal memorandum.  Second, the Fourth Circuit's summary of the facts offers less detail, yet one might infer from the decision, gives more wieght to the complaint's express and implied allegation that she was set up for trial board failure, unlike non-black officers.  See Amended Complaint, Doc. 20, No. 1:23-cv-02215-RDB (D. Md.), supra.  

Interestingly, the other officer against whom she testified, which began her troubles with the police department, also was African-American, though male.  This fact was not within the complaint, so the Fourth Circuit declined to consider it at this initial review stage. Slip Op. 13 n. 6.

II. Other Takeways

The court's opinion is a lesson in the practical aspects of a legal proceeding.  The lawsuit was at first dismissed at the outset, re-filed as amended, then dismissed again and finally, under what is called the 'motion to dismiss standard'.  As a result, the facts recited by the Fourth Circuit are before the discovery process and assumed true for review purpose.  In sum, the 'motion to dismiss standard' examines a complaint and assesses, even if true, does it state a legal claim?

What are the facts on appeal?  According to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, an African-American female police officer testified against another police officer who assaulted her friend at a nightclub.  This sparked blowback against her.  Notably, the facts of what happened are complex.  For instance, the blowback itself was related to her testifying, not based on her race, at least as summarized here.  See Slip Op. 1-16.

The claim of disparate treatment based on race arises because plaintiff alleges she was forced to resign, while white similarly situated officers were not, even if charged with a laundry list of legal violations, serious behavioral problems, or workplace infractions.  In other words, even if targeted due to testifying against some officer, she alleged that her discipline imposed was much harsher than experienced by nonblack police officers.  Because the Fourth Circuit, on appeal, was evaluating the complaint under a motion to dismiss standard, her allegations were assumed true, and taken together, deemed to allege enough to proceed.  See Slip Op. 1-16. 

III. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit has affirmed a lenient standard for the initial pleading stage, and affirmed the similar requirement for submitting comparison evidence from co-workers to plead an initial disparate treatment case. 

Most uniquely, the Fourth Circuit was willing to consider co-worker comparisons "together" to add up to a plausible disparate treatment claim at the initial pleading stage. Further, the Fourth Circuit rejected any hard and fast rule that comparsions must be from the exact same supervisor, or involve the exact same job title or rank, in each and every instance, but rather, the relevant key facts specific to the case would be the focus.