U.S. Supreme Court Affirms Single Standard for Claims of Race Discrimination in Employment Under The 1964 Civil Rights Act

The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed a single standard for racial discrimination employment claims, under Title VII of The 1964 Civil Rights Act, in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, Slip Op. 23-1039, 605 U.S. ___ (June 5, 2025).  This includes racial discrimination alleged by the "majority culture," or sometimes framed as "reverse race discrimination," because employers are alleged to fire Caucasians due to their Causasian and/or white race. 

This common sense view that TItle VII simply bans race discrimination against all races has been the active view within the Fourth Circult. The Fourth Circuit applies to Maryland federal courts, and to federal courts in the Virginas and Carolinas.  In Duvall v. Novant Health, Inc., 95 F. 4th 778 (4th Cir. 2024) for instance, the Fourth Circuit upheld a $3.4 million dollar verdict for a well-performing white male executive, David Duvall, who proved he was fired due to his white male status during a company DEI initiative. The company's DEI initiative lead to a racially discriminatory purge of Mr. Duvall,  as a proven motivating factor for his abrupt termination, according to the affirmed jury verdict after evidence was presented.

While the Fourth Circuit does not address the issue of a higher standard for majority-race individuals, which is addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ames, supra, the Fourth Circuit simply applied a mixed-motive analysis of the evidence to Mr. Duvall's case that would be typically applied.  See Duvial, Slip Op. at 15-16.  This makes sense, it must be added, because The 1964 Civil Rights Act bans racial discrimination, generally applied, and quoted further below.

I. The Ames Decision:

In Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the practices within the Sixth Circuit, which includes Ohio federal courts, where courts have been requiring those of a purported majority culture to have additional backrgound facts, compared to purported non-majority races, to show that an employer acted as an "unusual employer who discriminates against the majority."  Slip Op. at 5 (quoting the illegal Sixth Circuit practice).

In Ames as an initial matter, the single heterosexual white woman involved had to meet a heightened prima facie pleading at the outset, or her case would be thrown out of court. As the U.S. Supreme Court notes, there is nothing in The 1964 Civil Rights Act that permits a heightened pleading standard for any specific race or majority race or minority race too.  Slip Op. at 1-7.  Further, a "prima facie burden - is 'not onerous.'"  Slip Op. at 7. 

The Supreme Court states:

"As a textual matter, Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs. Rather, the provision makes it unlawful 'to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1) (emphasis added)."

Slip Op. at 7.  In other words, "Our case law thus makes clear that the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group."  Slip Op. at 8.

II. Some Takeaways:

It is worth noting as a practioner of employment discrimination law in the Fourth Circuit, in Maryland state and federal courts, I myself was surprised to hear about a hieghtened pleading standard for some and not others.  This idea seems a product of discriminatory mindset, in essence.  As the U.S. Supreme Court notes, federal law bans race discrimination generally under Title VII, cited above.  Overall, the Ames decision shows how legal interpretations can evolve off track.

To show the wrongheadedness of the Sixth Circuit, via hypotheticals, (1) if women perchance are the population majority in some locations, even if by 51% hypothetically, would that mean women would need to plead more facts than men to assert a gender discrimination claim?  This hypothetical leads to an absurd result.  The answer, however, is no, because such is illegal under Title VII, cited above.

In the same vein, (2) while Causasians may be a majority racial demographic in America, that may not be true within a specific U.S. state, or city, community, region, or workplace.  It seems a 'majority culture' view would require statistics be provided for each workplace or locale, etc., or risk ignoring what is happening in an actual workplace.  Again, this hypothetical does not reflect federal law under Title VII, cited above.  See Ames, supra.

The Sixth Circuit's intepretation, in sum, was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court as a misinterpretation of The U.S. 1964 Civil Rights Act.

III. Conclusion:

In Ames, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed a single standard for racial discrimination employment claims, under Title VII of The 1964 Civil Rights Act. This is consistent with Fourth Circult that covers Maryland federal courts. See Duvall v. Novant Health, Inc., 95 F. 4th 778 (4th Cir. 2024).